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REFLECTIONS ON THE AFRICAN 
UNION’S RIGHT TO INTERVENE 
Ntombizozuko Dyani-Mhango 
INTRODUCTION 
he African Union (“AU”) has reserved for itself a right to 
intervene in cases of crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide.1 This Article reflects on the AU’s right to 
intervention in order to ascertain what this right entails and 
also, how the AU has dealt with it so far. The AU law requires, 
and international law allows, for the AU to exercise its right to 
intervene in a member state where international crimes are 
being committed. In short, the AU has a legal duty to inter-
vene, evidenced by the codification of this duty in the AU’s 
Constitutive Act and by the establishment of organs that play 
crucial roles in allowing the AU to exercise this right. 
                                                                                                                                     
 LL.B, LL.M (Western Cape, South Africa); SJD (Wisconsin): Associate Pro-
fessor, Wits University School of Law. This Article forms part of the Thesis 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the SJD degree with 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA. This publication was made possi-
ble (in part) by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The 
statements made and views expressed are, however, solely the responsibility 
of the author. 
 1. Article 4(h) of the African Union (“AU”) Constitutive Act provides that 
the AU has the right to intervene in a member state in “grave circumstances, 
namely, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.” Constitutive 
Act of the African Union art. 4(h), May 26, 2001, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Constitutive Act]. The Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted at the thirty-
sixth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of States and Government of 
the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”) in Lome, Togo, on July 11, 2000 
and entered into force on May 26, 2001. Id. at 33–34, 44–46. See Dan Kuwali, 
Art. 4(H) + R2p: Towards a Doctrine of Persuasive Prevention to End Mass 
Atrocity Crimes, 3 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 55, 55 (2008–2009); Jonathan D. 
Rechner, From The OAU to the AU: A Normative Shift with Implications for 
Peacekeeping and Conflict Management, or Just a Name Change?, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 543, 544, 562 (2006); J. Emeka Wokoro, Towards a Model for 
African Humanitarian Intervention, 6 REG. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2008); Eliav 
Lieblich, Intervention and Consent: Consensual Forcible Interventions in In-
ternal Armed Conflicts as International Agreements, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 337, 
369 (2011); Vincent O. Nmehielle, The African Union and African Renais-
sance: A New Era for Human Rights Protection in Africa?, 7 SING. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 412, 414 (2003); Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Constitutive Act of the Afri-
can Union and Institution-Building in Postcolonial Africa, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L 
L. 157, 163-64 (2003). 
T
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However, the AU still needs to resolve some impediments 
that may bar it from exercising its right to intervene in a mem-
ber state in whose territory crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide are being committed. Among the impedi-
ments that need to be resolved is the need to clarify the mean-
ing of the right to intervene, which is not currently defined an-
ywhere in the AU treaties, decisions, or resolutions. Further, 
the AU may also be barred from exercising this right as it ap-
pears that the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, and 
territorial integrity of the AU member states are interpreted 
restrictively. The AU must deal with these issues before an at-
tempt to exercise the right to intervene is made. 
Part I of this Article explains the background to the for-
mation of the AU and how international and African communi-
ties have addressed atrocities in Africa in the past. Part II dis-
cusses the meaning of the AU’s right to intervene, and exam-
ines the relationship between the AU and the United Nations 
Security Council with regard to the issues of peace and security 
in the African region. Part III then describes the interventions 
exercised by the AU so far. 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE AU 
The current African regional system began with the estab-
lishment of the Organization of African Unity (“OAU”). The 
OAU was established by the OAU Charter in May 1963.2 Alt-
hough the OAU Charter refers to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in its preamble and in a provision outlining the 
purposes of the OAU, the priorities of the OAU Heads of State 
and Government (“OAU Assembly”) were not human rights.3 
                                                                                                                                     
 2. For a critical analysis of the OAU, see generally Alfred W. Chanda, 
The Organization of the African Unity: An Appraisal, 21–24 ZAMBIA L.J. 1 
(1989-92). 
 3. See Gino J. Naldi, Future Trends in Human Rights in Africa: The In-
creased Role of the OAU?, in THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS: THE SYSTEM IN PRACTICE, 1986–2000 at 2 (Malcolm D. Evans & Ra-
chel Murray eds., 2002). The purposes of the OAU are outlined in Art. 2(1) of 
the OAU Charter as follows: 
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; 
(b) To co-ordinate and intensify their cooperation and effort to 
achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; 
(c) To defend their sovereign, their territorial integrity and inde-
pendence; 
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and 
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Instead, the OAU Assembly was “[d]etermined to safeguard 
and consolidate the hard-won independence, as well as the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and fight 
against neo-colonialism in all its forms.”4 Therefore, the OAU 
Charter emphasized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
its member states, and enjoined those members from interfer-
ing in the internal affairs of other states.5 The following three 
over-riding principles guided the OAU for thirty-nine years:6 
First, all states were sovereign equals. Each state would have 
an equal say, with no greater weight given to larger or more 
powerful states. Second, states agreed not to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of fellow members. Third, territorial borders 
were sacrosanct, with no room for alteration in the status quo. 
Adoption of these principles reflected a bitter colonial experi-
ence. No longer did states want to be dominated by outsiders 
or risk border changes that would unleash ethnic rivalries 
and invite outside intervention.7 
                                                                                                                                     
(e) To promote international co-operation, having due regard to the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
Charter of the Organization of African Unity [OAU Charter] art. 2(1), May 
25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 70. 
 4. Id. at 70. See Claude E. Welch, Jr., The African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights: A Five-Year Report and Assessment, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 43, 
43 (1992) (noting that the founders of the OAU did not focus on human rights 
policy in the original OAU Charter). 
 5. See OAU Charter art. 3 (including “peaceful settlement of disputes by 
negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;” “unreserved condemna-
tion . . . of political assassination;” “absolute dedication to the total emancipa-
tion of the African territories which are still dependent;” and “affirmation of a 
policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs,” as its principles). For a dis-
cussion of the principles of the OAU, see generally T.O. ELIAS, AFRICA AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Richard Akinjide ed., 2d rev. ed. 
1988). 
 6. MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS: THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 204 
(2d ed. 2010). 
 7. Id. See also Naldi, supra note 3, at 2 (noting that “[a]ccount must also 
be taken of the fact that the States of Africa, most newly independent, jeal-
ously guarded their freedom and deeply resented any measures which hinted 
at external interference with their internal affairs.”); John Okpari, Policing 
and Preventing Human Rights Abuses in Africa: The OAU, the AU & the 
NEPAD Peer Review, 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 461, 462 (2004) (arguing that 
the OAU was formed primarily to secure “accelerated decolonization of the 
continent and the preservation of the territorial integrity” of the newly 
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Based on these principles, “heads of state avoided criticizing 
each other” during the OAU Assembly sessions, “which led not 
only to disappointment but to accusations of the OAU Assem-
bly [as merely] a ‘Heads of State Club,’” instead of being lead-
ers concerned with the human rights violations that were being 
committed in some of their territories.8 It is in this regard that 
the OAU was accused of being unable to curb conflicts escalat-
ing in the continent.9 
The OAU leaders have been criticized for the dismal record of 
African states regarding the protection of human rights.10 Even 
after the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights (“African Charter”)11 and the subsequent estab-
                                                                                                                                     
formed independent states); see also Nmehielle, supra note 1, at 412–15, 434–
35 (contending the OAU Charter neither made any express commitments to 
the protection of human rights generally nor the achievement of gender 
equality in particular as key objectives of the OAU). 
 8. Ben Kioko, The Right of Intervention Under the African Union’s Consti-
tutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention, 85, No. 852. INT’L. REV. 
RED CROSS 807, 814 (2003); see also Jeremy Sarkin, Humanitarian Interven-
tion and the Responsibility to Protect in Africa, in AFRICA’S HUMAN RIGHTS 
ARCHITECTURE 45, 56 (John Akokpari & Daniel Shea Zimbler eds., 2008). 
 9. See P. Mweti Munya, The Organization of African Unity and its Role in 
Regional Conflict Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation, 
19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 537, 538 (1998–1999) (noting the lack of success 
from the OAU’s historical record in conflict resolution, and arguing: “The ink 
had not even dried on the [OAU] Charter before the continent was plagued by 
conflicts, civil wars and a myriad of other problems. The celebrated organiza-
tion that many had hoped would consolidate continental security and nurture 
peace and stability had failed to do so.”) However, Musifiky Mwanasali, From 
Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The Emerging Doctrine of Conflict Pre-
vention in Africa, in THE AFRICAN UNION AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 41, 46 (John 
Akokpari, Angela Ndinga-Mavumba & Tim Murithi eds., 2008), notes that 
“The OAU is . . . recogni[z]ed for its efforts to prevent inter-state conflicts, 
including the Algeria-Morocco border war of 1963, the Ethiopia-Somalia bor-
der dispute of the 1970s, and the crisis in the Comoros in the late 1990s and 
early 2000.” 
 10. See, e.g., Nsongurua J. Udombana, Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? 
The African Union Treaty and Human Rights, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1177, 
1211 (2002) (noting that during the OAU era “African leaders fiddled while 
the edifice called ‘Africa’ was engulfed in conflagrations. Increasing political 
repression, denial of political choice, restrictions on freedom of association, 
and other human rights violations met with rare murmurs of dissent from 
the OAU.”); see also Nmehielle, supra note 1, at 412 (noting that many Afri-
can states were “engaged in outrageous human rights violations under the 
not so watchful eyes of the [OAU]”). 
 11. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
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lishment of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (“ACHPR”),12 OAU member states carried on with gross 
human rights violations that can often constitute international 
crimes. They also seemingly ignored the provisions of the Afri-
can Charter and the ACHPR’s pronouncements on human 
rights abuses without any apparent fear of repercussions from 
the OAU because they perceived that the mechanisms estab-
lished under the Charter were weak.13 The OAU was still occu-
pied with addressing racism and apartheid in Southern Africa, 
so it was not truly concerned with the human rights violations 
in the territories of its member states.14 Indeed, one legal 
scholar argues that the African Charter was adopted as a re-
sult of the pressure from the West.15 The only instances where 
the OAU was concerned with the internal affairs of the mem-
ber states was when the issue pertained to colonialism, domi-
nation, and apartheid in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe).16 It is in these instances that the OAU Assembly 
                                                                                                                                     
June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into 
force on Oct. 21, 1986). For a critical analysis of the African Charter, see gen-
erally B. Obinna Okere, The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with 
the European and American Systems, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 141 (1984); Richard Git-
tleman, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analy-
sis, 22 VA. J. INT’L L. 667 (1982); Philip Amoah, The African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights—An Effective Weapon for Human Rights?, 4 AFR. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 226 (1992). 
 12. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was estab-
lished by Art. 30 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights “to 
promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their protection in Africa.” 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, supra note 11, art. 30. For an 
analysis of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see gen-
erally EVELYN A. ANKUMAH, THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND 
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS (1996). 
 13. Nmehielle, supra note 1, at 413–14. 
 14. See FRANS VILJOEN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA, 163 
(2007) (noting that the OAU “turned a blind eye” when it came to human 
rights violations in member states because of the principle of “non-
interference”); see also notes 16 and 17 infra discussing the OAU resolutions 
and decisions when it came to racism and apartheid in Southern Africa, i.e., 
South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
 15. See U. Oji Umozurike, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 902, 903–04 (1983). 
 16. U. Oji Umozurike, The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Char-
ter, 78 AFR. AFF. 197, 202 (1979) (noting that the only two exceptions to non-
interference are when questions of colonialism or apartheid arose). 
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was proactive and passed resolutions that expressly rejected 
colonialism, domination, and similar practices, and even called 
on its member states to assist in the liberation movements.17 
One can argue that the rationale for the OAU’s behavior in 
these specific cases stemmed from the OAU Charter, which 
clearly stated that the purposes of the OAU were to fight colo-
nization and the dominance of the colonizers.18 
The African states began to realize that there was a need to 
respond effectively to conflicts as there was a worldwide change 
in the early 1990s.19 One factor that led to this change of heart 
                                                                                                                                     
 17. See, e.g., OAU, Resolutions Adopted by First Conference of Independent 
African Heads of State and Government Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
O.A.U. Doc. CIAS/PLEN.2/REV.2 (May 22–25, 1963) (agenda items including 
decolonization, apartheid, and racial discrimination); see also OAU, Apart-
heid and Racial Discrimination, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 6(I) (July 17–21, 
1964) (“[n]oting with grave concern the consistent refusal of the Government 
of South Africa to give consideration to appeals by every sector of world opin-
ion and in particular the resolutions of the [U.N.] Security Council and Gen-
eral Assembly.”); OAU, Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in the Republic 
of South Africa, ¶¶ 4, 10, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 34 (II) (Oct. 21–26, 1965) 
(“call[ing] on all states to institute a strict embargo on the supply of arms and 
ammunition and other material for use by military and police forces in South 
Africa,” and inviting “the South African liberation movements to concert their 
policies and actions and intensify the struggle for full equality, and appeals to 
all States to lend moral and material assistance to the liberation movements 
in their struggle.”); OAU, Southern Rhodesia, ¶ 1, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res. 8(I) 
(July 17–24, 1964) (requesting the “African States to take a vigorous stand 
against a Declaration of Independence of Southern Rhodesia by a European 
minority government and to pledge themselves to take appropriate measures, 
including the recognition and support of an African nationalist government-
in-exile should such an eventuality arise.”); OAU, Southern Rhodesia, ¶ 6, 
O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res 25 (II) (Oct. 21–25, 1965) (resolving “to use all possible 
means including force to oppose a unilateral declaration of independence,” 
and “to give immediate assistance to the people of Zimbabwe with a view to 
establishing a majority government in the country.”); OAU, Territories Under 
Portuguesse Domination, ¶ 1, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Res 9(I) (“condemning Portu-
gal for its persistent refusal to recognise the right of the peoples under its 
domination to self-determination and independence.”). 
 18. See OAU Charter art. 2(1)(d) (noting that one of the purposes of the 
OAU is “[t]o eradicate all forms of colonialism); id. art. 3(6) (including one of 
the principles of the OAU: “[a]bsolute dedication to the total emancipation of 
the African territories which are still dependent.”). 
 19. SAMUEL M. MAKINDA & F. WAFULA OKUMU, THE AFRICAN UNION: 
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION, SECURITY, AND GOVERNANCE 29 (2008) (noting 
that “[b]y the early 1990s, globalization and the end of the Cold War had 
compelled African states to recognize the structural weakness that had pre-
vented the OAU from responding effectively to conflicts.”). 
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was that “it was becoming evident that the West and the [U.N.] 
Security Council were not responding promptly to African prob-
lems, particularly security matters.”20 The U.N. missions in 
Angola21 and in Somalia,22 for example, failed to restore peace 
in the countries.23 As a result, it was argued that the failure of 
these missions led to an unwillingness on the part of the U.N. 
to become involved in African conflicts in general.24 One signifi-
cant consequence of this reluctance by the U.N. is the failure of 
the international community to provide adequate troops or suf-
ficient mandate to the U.N. Mission in Rwanda (“UNAMIR”), 
which was on the ground as early as 1994.25 Had the interna-
tional community acted in time, the genocide and massive sex-
ual violence against women in Rwanda would not have oc-
curred. 
Therefore, during the Ouagadougou OAU Summit in 1998, 
South Africa’s then President Nelson Mandela told his fellow 
leaders that 
we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of na-
tional sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right 
                                                                                                                                     
 20. Id. 
 21. These missions are UNAVEM I, UNAVEM II and MONUA, which oc-
curred between 1991 and 1999. For the background to the U.N. missions in 
Angola, see U.N. Mission of Observers in Angola, United Nations Peacekeep-
ing Operations, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/monua_b.htm (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
 22. These missions are UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II, which were support-
ed by UNITAF and led by the United States (between late 1992 and May 
1993). For the background to the U.N. operations in Somalia, see Mission 
Backgrounder, U.N. Operation in Somalia I, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012). 
 23. See Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, Can the African Union Deliver Peace and 
Security?, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 35, 36 (2011). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See generally ROMÉO A. DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE 
FAILURE OF HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2004) (giving the account of the failure by 
the international community to act during the Rwandan genocide); Rep. of 
the Indep. Inquiry into the Action of the U.N. During the 1994 Genocide in 
Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999) (by Ingvar Carlsson, Han 
Sung-Joo & Rufus M. Kupolati); INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT 
PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE 
SURROUNDING EVENTS, ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, RWANDA: THE 
PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE (2000). 
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and duty to intervene when behind those sovereign bounda-
ries, people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny.26 
This speech is remarkable as former President Mandela specif-
ically defended the right to intervene in member states in the 
name of protecting human rights. Soon after this speech, the 
OAU Assembly adopted the Constitutive Act, which established 
the AU.27 
The process leading to the adoption of the Constitutive Act 
and the subsequent establishment of the AU began at the Al-
giers Summit in 1999.28 At this Summit, the AU Assembly was 
“deeply convinced the [OAU] ha[d] played an irreplaceable role 
in the affirmation of political identity and the realization of the 
unity of our continent.”29 The Algiers Summit further identified 
new challenges for the future and urged that the continent “en-
ter the Third Millennium with a genuine spirit of cooperation 
with restored human dignity and a common hope in an inter-
dependent future for mankind.”30 Then came the Sirte Declara-
tion,31 which was adopted during the OAU’s extraordinary 
summit, convened at Libya’s request, “[to deliberate] extensive-
ly on ways and means of making the OAU effective so as to 
keep pace with the political and economic development taking 
place in the world and the preparation required of Africa with-
in the context of globalization so as to preserve its social, eco-
nomic and political potentials.”32 
                                                                                                                                     
 26. Nelson Mandela, President of the Republic of South Africa, 
Address to the Summit Meeting of the OAU Heads of State and Government 
(June 8, 1998) (transcript available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/1998/98609_0w1849810090.htm). 
 27. See Maluwa, supra note 1, at 157, (noting that the Constitutive Act 
was adopted by the OAU on July 11, 2000, almost two years before the inau-
guration of the AU). It is the author’s assumption that it was “soon after” the 
speech of former President Mandela that the Constitutive Act was adopted. 
This is based on the fact that the Constitutive Act in art. 4(h) included the 
right to intervene. 
 28. See Algiers Declaration, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.1 (XXXV), ¶ 8 (July 12–
14, 1999). 
 29. Id. ¶ 3. 
 30. Id. ¶ 8. 
 31. Sirte Declaration, O.A.U. Doc. EAHG/Draft/Decl. (IV) Rev.1 (Sept. 8–9, 
1999) [hereinafter Sirte Declaration]. 
 32. OAU, Decisions on the Convening of an Extraordinary Session of the 
OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Accordance with Article 
33(5) of its Rules of Procedure, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Dec.140 (XXXV) at 22–23 
(July 12–14, 1999). 
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The OAU Assembly declared that it was also “determined to 
eliminate the scourge of conflicts, which constitutes a major 
impediment into the implementation of our development and 
integration agenda.”33 Thus, the pertinent part of the Sirte 
Declaration provides as follows: 
8. Having discussed frankly and extensively on how to pro-
ceed with the strengthening of the unity of our continent and 
its peoples, in the light of those proposals, and bearing in 
mind the current situation on the continent, we DECIDE TO: 
(i) Establish an African Union, in conformity with the 
ultimate objectives of the Charter of our continental 
Organization and the provisions of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the African Economic Community. 
(ii) Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty 
Establishing the African Economic Community, in 
particular: 
Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja 
Treaty, 
Ensure the speedy establishment of all the institu-
tions provided for the in the Abuja Treaty, such as the 
African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, 
the African Court of Justice and, in particular, the 
Pan-African Parliament . . . 
Strengthening and consolidating the Regional Eco-
nomic Communities as the pillars for achieving the 
objectives of the African Economic Community and 
realizing the envisaged Union . . . .34 
The AU “was officially launched in Durban, South Africa and 
effectively replaced the OAU” on July 10–12, 2002.35 During 
the inauguration of the AU, former President Thabo Mbeki of 
South Africa declared the following: 
Together we must work for peace, security and stability for 
the people of this continent. We must end the senseless con-
flicts and wars on our continent which have caused so much 
                                                                                                                                     
 33. Sirte Declaration, supra note 31, ¶ 6. 
 34. Id. ¶ 8. 
 35. Nmehielle, supra note 1, at 415. See also, African Union [AU], The 
Durban Declaration in Tribute to the Organisation of African Unity and on 
the Launching of the African Union, A.U. Doc. ASS/AU/Decl. 2 (I) (July 10, 
2002). 
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pain and suffering to our people and turned many of them in-
to refugees and displaces and forced others into exile.36 
This brought “hope . . . for a better future for the peoples of Af-
rica.”37 The move from OAU to AU has been argued to be the 
first step for Africa to demonstrate its seriousness about pro-
tecting human rights and to maintain peace, security, and sta-
bility in Africa.38 However, not everyone saw this move as a 
promise by the African leaders to the Africans that the AU will 
take human rights seriously.39 As such, the AU was seen as “an 
old wine in a new wine skin.” 40 
However, the Constitutive Act of the AU has provisions that 
clearly refer to human rights and armed conflicts in Africa. For 
example, the preamble stipulates that African leaders are “con-
scious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa consti-
tutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of 
the continent and the need to promote peace, security and sta-
bility as a prerequisite for the implementation of our develop-
ment and integration agenda.”41 Consequently, they are “de-
termined to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights . . . 
and to ensure good governance and the rule of law.”42 Further, 
the Constitutive Act provides that its objectives include “pro-
mot[ing] and protect[ing] human and peoples’ rights in accord-
ance with the [African Charter] and other human rights in-
struments.”43 
                                                                                                                                     
 36. Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the African Union, Launch of the African 
Union (July 9, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.africa-
uion.org/official_documents/Speeches_&_Statements/HE_Thabo_Mbiki/LAUn
ch%20of%20the%20African%20Union,%209%20July%202002.htm). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Evarist Baimu, The African Union: Hope for Better Protection of 
Human Rights in Africa, 1 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 299, 306–07 (2001);see also 
Corinne A. A. Packer & Donald Rukare, The New African Union and Its Con-
stitutive Act, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 379 (2002). 
 39. Udombana, supra note 10, at 1258, 1259 (arguing that the AU “is not 
likely to take human rights seriously—even though that is greatly desired” 
and that the “adoption of the [Constitutive Act] has more to do with the hys-
teria of globalization than the euphoria of unity, or for that matter, human 
rights.”). 
 40. Id., at 1258. 
 41. See Constitutive Act, at 35. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. art. 3(h). 
2012] AFRICAN UNION'S RIGHT TO INTERVENE 11 
Like the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act also prioritizes 
the principles of state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
non-interference as the Constitutive Act defends these princi-
ples as “a core objective of the [AU]”44 and that the AU will 
function in accordance with the principle “of non-interference 
by any Member State in the internal affairs of another.”45 On 
the other hand, unlike the OAU Charter, the Constitutive Act 
places limitations on state sovereignty by defining sovereignty 
in terms of a state’s willingness and capacity to provide protec-
tion to its nationals.46 Further, the end of the Cold War pre-
sented African leaders with a set of new challenges, which in-
cluded the “rethinking of the principle of non-interference” in 
the internal affairs of another state.47 The African leaders’ ef-
forts to deal with these challenges required innovation and cre-
ativity.48 Thus, it is not surprising that, through the Constitu-
tive Act, the AU has reserved for itself a right to intervene in 
cases of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. 
The question remains: What does this right to intervene mean? 
II. THE AU’S RIGHT TO INTERVENE, SOME POSITIVE OUTCOMES, 
AND SOME IMPEDIMENTS 
The AU also refers to the right to intervene in the yet-to-
come-into-force Kampala Convention on the protection and as-
sistance of internally displaced persons49 and in decisions made 
                                                                                                                                     
 44. See id. art. 3(b). 
 45. Id. art. 4(g); AU, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace 
and Security Council of the African Union [PSC Protocol] art. 4(f), July 9, 
2002, available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/asf/doc/PSC%20protocol.pdf. 
 46. See A. Abass & M. Baderin, Towards Effective Collective Security and 
Human Rights Protection in Africa: An Assessment of the Constitutive Act of 
the New African Union, 49 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 19 (2002). Abass and Ba-
derin argue that: “What the AU members contracted out of by giving their 
consent to intervention by AU is the principle of ‘non-intervention’. . . .” Fur-
ther, “[b]y ratifying the AU Act, African states must be understood to have 
agreed that the AU can intervene in their affairs accordingly. In empowering 
the [AU] to that effect under Article 4(h), the states must be taken to have 
conceded a quantum of their legal and political sovereignty to the [AU].” Id. 
 47. Max Sesay, Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia, 23 REV. 
AFR. POL. ECON. 35, 50 (1996). 
 48. See generally id. (describing challenges that African nations faced dur-
ing the post-Cold War era). 
 49. See AU, Convention on the Protection and Assistance of the Internally 
Displaced Persons [hereinafter Kampala Convention], at 1–2, Oct. 23, 2009, 
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by the AU Assembly, which is the supreme organ of the AU.50 
However, neither these treaties (the Constitutive Act and the 
Kampala Convention) nor the AU Assembly decisions define 
this right.51 As a result, some legal scholars have correctly as-
sumed that the right to intervene confers the right to use of 
force and equates to the controversial humanitarian interven-
tion (“HMI”).52 A few scholars even argue that it is preferable to 
insist that the AU has a duty to intervene rather than a 
“right,” as a “right” implies that the AU does not have to inter-
vene when circumstances that pertain to crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, and genocide occur.53 A legal duty, on the 
                                                                                                                                     
available at http://www.au.int/en/content/african-union-convention-
protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa. As of Feb. 10, 
2012, only one state has ratified the Convention while twenty-nine states 
have signed it, and the Convention needs fifteen ratifications to come into 
force. See List of Countries Which Have Signed Ratified/Acceded to the Afri-
can Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Disputed 
Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), AFRICAN UNION (Aug. 14, 2012), 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Convention%20on%20IDPs%20-
%20displaced..._0.pdf. Art. 8(1) of the Kampala Convention provides that 
“[t]he [AU] shall have the right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive 
Act in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, and 
crimes against humanity.” Kampala Convention art. 8(1). 
 50. See, e.g., AU, Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly’s Deci-
sions on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX. CL/670 (XIX), ¶ 2, A.U. 
Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 366 (XVII) (June 30–July 1, 2011) (reiterating “its 
commitment to fight impunity in conformity with the provisions of Article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union”) (emphasis added); AU, De-
cision on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction Doc. EX.CL/640 
(XVIII), ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 335 (XVI) (Jan. 30–31, 2011) (also 
reiterating “its commitment to fight impunity in conformity with the provi-
sions of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union”) (emphasis 
added). 
 51. There is no provision in the Constitutive Act or the Kampala Conven-
tion which defines the AU’s right to intervene. 
 52. See, e.g., Nsongurua Udombana, When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur 
Crisis and the Crisis of a Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan, 27 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 1149, 1149 (2005) [hereinafter When Neutrality is a Sin]; Jeremy Sarkin, 
The Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa’s Sub-regional 
Organizations in Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems: Connecting 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, 53 J. AFR. L. 1, 
25 (2009) [hereinafter Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems]. 
 53. See When Neutrality is a Sin, supra note 52, at 1157 n.42 (arguing that 
“the use of the word ‘right’ in referring to humanitarian intervention is a 
misnomer,” and observing that “[h]uman rights law is created for the benefit 
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other hand, may create legal consequences for the AU if it fails 
to execute its obligation to intervene as compared to a discre-
tionary “right to intervene.”54 It is important to examine the 
content of this right to ascertain its meaning. 
According to the Constitutive Act, the criterion for the exer-
cise of intervention by the AU is twofold: first, it may be exer-
cised only in cases of international crimes, such as crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide; and second, as-
suming that the AU has the necessary resources (financial or 
otherwise) to intervene if international crimes are committed 
in the territory of a member state, the implication is that the 
AU will be willing to exercise the right to intervene.55 The Con-
stitutive Act does not define crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and genocide as its drafters presumed that there was 
no need to do so, these crimes being already defined in the 
Rome Statute and the statutes of the international criminal 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.56 Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                     
of individuals and casts ‘duties’ on states to intervene to respect, promote, 
and fulfill those norms, including the ‘duty’ on other states to intervene to 
stop gross human rights violations in another.”). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Constitutive Act art. 4; see also Wokoro, supra note 1, at 21. Woro-
ko argues that: 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding its consensual orientation, absence 
of a debilitating veto arrangement, and dedication to human rights, 
there is scant reason to believe that the African Security Council is 
any more potent, effective, or responsible than the U.N. Security 
Council, and there is little evidence to support the repudiation of the 
sacrosanct sovereignty that characterized the OAU. Indeed, while 
the U.S. Congress accused Sudan of genocide in Darfur and strode to 
the world stage to rally global support against Sudan, the [AU] sty-
mied those efforts, stating that the dire humanitarian situation in 
Darfur “cannot be defined as a genocide. 
Id. 
 56. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (The Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) was estab-
lished to prosecute “persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991.”). For the definitions of the crimes contained in the Statute of ICTY, 
see U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Par-
agraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, at 37–38, U.N. Doc. S/25704 
(May 3, 1993). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) was 
established for the “prosecuti[on] of persons responsible for genocide and oth-
er serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
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Professor Maluwa, the AU’s counsel at the time the Constitu-
tive Act was drafted, explains that 
[t]he original proposal to incorporate the right of intervention 
in article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act was heavily debated 
during the ministerial meetings that examined the draft texts 
in 2000. The limitation of the grounds for intervention to war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity was predicated 
on the understanding that these acts are now generally rec-
ognized as violations of international law, as evidenced in the 
statutes of the international tribunals for Rwanda and the 
Former Yugoslavia, and most recently the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. As it presently stands, 
therefore, Article 4(h) is in line with current international 
law.57 
The Rome Statute outlines a specific procedure that is to be fol-
lowed before an indictment for international crimes may be is-
sued against a perpetrator.58 This includes the collection and 
an examination of evidence and the questioning of individuals, 
including any victims, by the prosecution team.59 This process 
also requires the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) Pre-
Trial Chamber to decide if the issuance of an arrest warrant is 
necessary for a particular situation.60 
However, for the intervention envisaged in terms of Article 
4(h), the Constitutive Act does not provide a procedure to fol-
low.61 It is unclear whether the AU Assembly may first conduct 
an investigation before determining if an intervention is neces-
                                                                                                                                     
ritory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other 
violations in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 
and 31 December 1994 . . . .” S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 
1994). For the definitions of the crimes contained in the Statute of the ICTR, 
see id. ¶¶ 3–5. 
 57. Tiyanjana Maluwa, The OAU/African Union and International Law: 
Mapping New Boundaries or Revisiting Old Terrain?, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. 
PROC. 232, 236 (2004) [hereinafter OAU/African Union and International 
Law]. 
 58. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 53–58, Jul. 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 59. See id. arts. 51, 54. 
 60. See id. arts. 53–58. 
 61. ALEX J. BELLAMY, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO 
END MASS ATROCITIES 78 (2009) (arguing that “the AU remains unclear about 
both the procedural and substantive conditions” under which the intervention 
would be exercised). 
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sary, or whether it needs to first decide to intervene before 
finding out if indeed international crimes were committed in a 
member state.62 Article 4(h) requires that there must be a 
commission of an international crime to necessitate an inter-
vention.63 Also, the AU has created organs specifically for the 
purpose of going on fact-finding missions, enabling the AU As-
sembly to decide on whether to take action.64 Therefore, it 
makes sense to establish the commission of the international 
crime prior to intervention. 
There is no institution operational yet to interpret Article 
4(h) of the Constitutive Act or the AU Assembly’s decision to 
intervene or not to intervene. The African Court of Justice, 
which is one of the AU institutions, is not yet operational65 
even though the Protocol that establishes it has been in force 
since 2009.66 Instead, the AU has decided to adopt a Protocol on 
                                                                                                                                     
 62. Dan Kuwali, The Conundrum of Conditions for Intervention Under 
Article 4(h) of the African Union Act, 17 AFR. SECURITY REV. 90, 93 (2008) 
(arguing that the Constitutive Act is “silent on how to intervene” and is “in-
complete on how to decide when to intervene”). Kuwali also argues that 
“[a]lthough the [AU Assembly] can decide on intervention on its own initia-
tive or at the request of a member state pursuant to article 4(j), the provision 
does not spell out a clear cut threshold that would warrant intervention.” Id. 
 63. Constitutive Act art. 4(h). 
 64. In particular, the AU created the Panel of the Wise, which has already 
conducted fact-finding missions in places such as Libya and the Darfur, and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. See Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights 
Problems, supra note 53, at 15–16 (discussing the institutional organs of the 
AU relevant to the exercise of the right to intervene); see also infra Part III.B 
(discussing the institutional organs of the AU relevant to the exercise of the 
right to intervene). 
 65. Constitutive Act art. 5(1)(d). The AU Assembly has not appointed 
judges to the African Court of Justice even though the Protocol establishing 
the Court has reached the necessary ratifications needed in order to come 
into force. See note 68 infra. Instead, the AU Assembly has recently request-
ed the AU Commission and the AfCHPR “to prepare a study on the financial 
and structural implications resulting from the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
the [AfCHPR] and submit the study along with the Draft Protocol on the 
Amendments to the Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights for consideration at the next summit slated for January 
2013.” See AU, Decision on the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. As-
sembly/AU/Dec.427 (XIX) (July 15–16, 2012). 
 66. The Protocol of the Court of Justice of the AU came into force on Feb. 
11, 2009 after acquiring fifteen ratifications. See List of Countries Which 
Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol of the Court of Justice of the 
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the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
to merge the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(“AfCHPR”) and the African Court of Justice into one.67 This 
Protocol will replace the prior protocols that established the 
AfCHPR and the African Court of Justice.68 The existing Proto-
col of the African Court of Justice provides that the African 
Court of Justice is the AU’s “principal judicial organ,”69 which 
will “function in accordance with the provisions of the [Consti-
tutive] Act and this Protocol.”70 Article 18 of the Protocol of the 
African Court of Justice establishes personal jurisdiction of the 
African Court of Justice, which includes state parties to the 
Protocol, the AU Assembly, and other organs of the AU as au-
thorized by the AU Assembly.71 
The African Court of Justice has subject matter jurisdiction 
over the interpretation and application of the Constitutive 
Act;72 any question of international law;73 all acts, decisions, 
regulations, and directives of AU organs;74 and circumstances 
that would constitute a breach of an obligation owed to a state 
party or the AU.75 Thus, the African Court of Justice will be 
helpful in interpreting Article 4(h) to ascertain the meaning of 
intervention. However, the Constitutive Act provides that if the 
                                                                                                                                     
African Union, AFRICAN UNION (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Court%20of%20Justice_0.pdf. 
 67. See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights [Protocol of the Statute of African Court] art. 2, July 1, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 
317. So far there are only five ratifications for this Protocol. See List of Coun-
tries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol on the Statute of 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, AFRICAN UNION (Nov. 12, 
2012), 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol%20on%20Statute%20of%20th
e%20African%20Court%20of%20Justice%20and%20HR.pdf. The African 
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (“AfCHPR”) is established by the Organ-
ization of African Unity. See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and 
People’s Rights [Protocol to AfCHPR], June 10, 1998, reprinted in 12 AFR. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 187 (2000). 
 68. Protocol of the Statute of African Court arts. 1, 2. 
 69. See Protocol of the Court of Justice of the African Union art. 2(2), July 
11, 2003, reprinted in 13 AFR. J. INT’L. COMP. L. 115 (2005). 
 70. Id. art. 2(1). 
 71. Id. art. 18(1)(a)–(b). 
 72. Id. art. 19(1)(a). 
 73. Id. art. 19(1)(c). 
 74. Id. art. 19(1)(d). 
 75. Id. art. 19(1)(f). 
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organ responsible for its interpretation is not operational, the 
AU Assembly can assume such function as long as the decision 
reaches a two-thirds majority.76 This may be problematic, espe-
cially when it comes to deciding on the meaning of the right to 
intervene, as the AU Assembly may be embroiled in disagree-
ments. It is therefore necessary to have an impartial body to 
interpret this right. However, the correct assumption has been 
that the AU’s right to intervene can be equated to the use of 
force.77 This assumption is based on the fact that, in order to 
exercise this right, the AU has made provisions for the estab-
lishment of an armed force whose responsibility includes inter-
vention as contemplated in the Constitutive Act.78 Less intru-
sive means of intervention are listed outside this right.79 
There has not been an instance where the meaning of the 
AU’s right to intervention has been questioned in practical 
terms. One hopes that when that time comes the African Court 
of Justice will be fully operational. 
A. The Relationship Between the AU and the Security Council 
on the AU’s Right to Intervene 
As mentioned above, the AU has reserved for itself a right to 
intervene in a member state where international crimes are 
being committed.80 Intervention by use of force triggers the ap-
plication of the United Nations Charter.81 The U.N. Charter 
provides that “[a]ll Members [of the U.N.] shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.”82 The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
made clear in Nicaragua v. United States that prohibiting the 
                                                                                                                                     
 76. Constitutive Act art. 26. 
 77. Legal scholars have assumed that the AU’s right to intervene can 
mean the use of force. See When Neutrality is a Sin, supra note 52, at 1156–
57; Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems, supra note 52, at 25. 
 78. See, e.g., PSC Protocol art. 13(1) (establishing the African Standby 
Force in order to “enable the Peace and Security Council perform its respon-
sibilities with respect to . . . intervention pursuant to [A]rticle 4(h) . . . of the 
Constitutive Act”). 
 79. See Constitutive Act art. 23(2) (providing sanctions against member 
states that fail to comply with the AU decisions). 
 80. See id. art. 4(h), (j). 
 81. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 82. Id. 
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use of force is a part of customary international law.83 On the 
other hand, the principle of non-intervention does not apply 
against the U.N. Security Council when it takes enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.84 The Securi-
ty Council may, in appropriate circumstances, recommend in-
tervention by U.N. forces or by individual states.85 The aim of 
the drafters of the U.N. Charter was not only to prohibit the 
use of force by states under Article 2(4), but also to centralize 
control of the use of force in the Security Council under Chap-
ter VII of the U.N. Charter.86 The Security Council therefore 
has the primary responsibility to decide on the use of force, 
though that power may be delegated to regional organiza-
tions.87 
The Constitutive Act strongly implies that the AU, not the 
Security Council, may assume primary responsibility in cases 
of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide in Afri-
ca. In fact, there is nothing in the AU Constitutive Act or in the 
                                                                                                                                     
 83. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 202 (June 27); see also Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 
148 (Dec. 19) (reaffirming that this principle is “the cornerstone of the [U.N.] 
Charter”). 
 84. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter provides that “[t]he Security Council 
shall determine the existence of any threat to peace, breach of peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall 
be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security.” U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 85. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1999), (“According to [the U.N. Charter] provisions, 
the Security Council, after having determined that a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression has occurred, may, if necessary, take 
military enforcement action involving the armed forces of the Member States. 
In actual UN practice, it is now common for such enforcement action to be 
carried out on the basis of a mandate to, or more frequently of an authorisa-
tion of, states which are willing to participate either individually or in ad hoc 
coalitions or acting through regional or other international organizations . . . 
.”); see also Richard A. Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on 
Israel’s Security Wall, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 42, 46 (2005) (arguing that the U.N. 
Charter does not preclude intervention “provided it is mandated by the Secu-
rity Council”). 
 86. See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 254–
55 (3d ed. 2008). 
 87. See U.N. Charter arts. 52–53. 
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Peace and Security Council (“PSC”) Protocol88 that expressly 
requires the AU to seek prior authorization from the U.N. Se-
curity Council before authorizing or exercising intervention. 
Instead, the PSC Protocol entrusts to itself the “primary re-
sponsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Afri-
ca.”89 This is in contrast with the U.N. Charter, which provides, 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 90 
On the other hand, the PSC Protocol provides as follows: 
 
In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and 
maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa the 
Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely 
with the United Nations Security Council, which has the pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also 
cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies 
in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. 
 
Where necessary, recourse will be made to the [U.N.] to pro-
vide the necessary financial, logistical and military support 
for the [AU]’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of 
peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the 
provisions of Chapter VIII of the [U.N. Charter] on the role of 
Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international 
peace and security.91 
 
These texts suggest that the AU is willing to assume the 
primary role when it comes to the conflicts in Africa. Only 
                                                                                                                                     
 88. Protocol to Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the AU (“PSC 
Protocol”) came into force on Dec. 26, 2003 after twenty-seven states of the 
AU ratified it, and as of May 21, 2012, forty-seven out of fifty-four African 
states have ratified the PSC Protocol. See List of Countries Which Have 
Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the 
Peace and Security Council of the African Union, AFRICAN UNION (July 13, 
2012), 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Peace%20and%20Security_0.pdf. 
 89. PSC Protocol art. 16. 
 90. U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1. 
 91. PSC Protocol art. 17. 
20 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
when it is necessary, especially when the AU is in dire need of 
financial support, the AU will consider the role of the Security 
Council.92 African legal scholars justify this AU power by point-
ing to the Rwandan genocide, which “remains . . . ‘a deplorable 
example of [the] international community’s disinterest in the 
African continent,’”93 where “an estimated 800,000 Tutsis were 
killed in Rwanda in 1994.”94 Professor Udombana pointed out 
that “[t]ragically, the international community failed to fore-
stall the genocide, despite the wide publicity given to it in the 
world’s media, prior to and during the pogrom.”95 He main-
tained that, as a result, “Africa’s desire to take urgent actions 
to stop massacres or serious fighting in the immediate future 
may trump any commitment to cooperate with the [Security 
Council].”96 Ben Kioko, the AU’s Legal Advisor, explained that 
“when questions were raised as to whether the [AU] could pos-
sibly have an inherent right to intervene other than through 
the Security Council, they were dismissed out of hand.”97 He 
argued that this decision reflects a sense of frustration with the 
slow pace of reform of the international community and the 
                                                                                                                                     
 92. See Kwesi Aning & Samuel Atuobi, Responsibility to Protect in Africa: 
An Analysis of the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture, 1 GLOBAL 
RESP. PROTECT 90, 103–04 (2009) (“It is clear from the proactive intervention-
ist language in both the Constitutive Act and the PSC Protocol that while the 
[AU recognizes the Security Council’s] primacy in maintaining international 
peace and security, . . . the AU has also reserved for itself an interventionist 
role that reverts to the Security Council only when the AU deems neces-
sary.”); see also Jeremy L. Levitt, The Peace and Security Council of the Afri-
can Union and the United Nations Security Council: The Case of Darfur, in 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE USE OF FORCE: THEORY, REALITY—A NEED 
FOR CHANGE? 213, 229–30 (Niels Blokker & Nico Schrijver eds., 2005). Levitt 
contends that read together, the relevant provisions of the AU Constitutive 
Act Articles 4(h) and (j) and the PSC Protocol Articles 4(j) and (k), 6(d), 7(c)–
(g), 16(1), and 17(1) and (2) “reveal that while the AU acknowledges the ‘pri-
mary’ role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and 
security, particularly in Africa, it reserves the right to authorize intervention 
in Africa, seeking UN involvement ‘where necessary.’” Id. (quoting PSC Pro-
tocol, supra note 45, arts. 17(1)–(2)). 
 93. See When Neutrality is a Sin, supra note 53, at 1175 (quoting Daniela 
Kroslak, Book Review, 75 INT’L AFF. 877 (1999) (reviewing ARTHUR JAY 
KLINGOFFER, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 
(1998))). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1176. 
 97. See Kioko, supra note 8, at 821. 
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tendency to focus attention on other parts of the world at the 
expense of more pressing problems in Africa.98 In addition, 
Ambassador Sam Ibok, the Director of the Peace and Security 
Department of the AU, stated the following: 
We [the AU] are not an arm of the United Nations. We accept 
the UN’s global authority, but we will not wait for the UN to 
authorize an action that we intend to take . . . . [W]e are in 
tacit agreement with the [U.N.] on this and there is an under-
standing to that effect.99 
These statements show the African community’s frustration 
over the Security Council and the international community’s 
past failures to act against the atrocities committed during 
armed conflict in Africa. On the other hand, some scholars have 
argued that the provisions of the Constitutive Act and the PSC 
Protocol regarding the AU’s right to intervene violate Article 
103 of the U.N. Charter.100 
The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change 
(“the Ezulwini Consensus”),101 which was adopted by the AU in 
                                                                                                                                     
 98. Id. 
 99. Interview by Ademola Abass with Ambassador Sam Ibok, (Feb. 2, 
2004), in ADEMOLA ABASS, REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: BEYOND CHAPTER VIII OF THE UN CHARTER 166 
(2004). 
 100. See David Wippman, Treaty-based Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 620 (1995) (arguing that “[c]ritics of treaty-based inter-
vention contend that any treaty purporting to authorize states to use force 
against another state without its contemporaneous consent necessarily vio-
lates Article 2(4) and therefore also Article 103 . . . .”); see also Rudolf Bern-
hardt, Article 103, in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 
1117, 1122 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994). Bernard contends: “if the mem-
bers of a regional arrangement . . . agree that in case of internal disturbances 
or other events within one of the states concerned, the other state(s) can in-
tervene with military forces without the consent of the de jure or de facto gov-
ernment, the compatibility of such a special agreement with the Charter be-
comes doubtful and must, in principle be denied. Here, the territorial integri-
ty of all states and the prohibition of the use of force is at stake. An agree-
ment permitting forceful intervention would hardly be compatible with the 
Charter and would fall under Article 103.” Id. Art. 103 of the U.N. Charter 
provides: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of 
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Char-
ter shall prevail.” U.N. Charter art. 103. 
 101. See Rep. of the High Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 
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2005, presents another perspective through “The Common Af-
rican Position on the Proposed Reform of the [U.N.]”102 It states 
in clear terms the position of the AU on its relationship with 
the Security Council on one hand, and Article 4(h) of the AU 
Act vis-à-vis the U.N. Charter law on intervention on the other: 
Since the General Assembly and the Security Council are of-
ten far from the scenes of the conflicts and may not be in a 
position to undertake effectively a proper appreciation of the 
nature and development conflict situations, it is imperative 
that Regional Organizations, in areas of proximity to conflicts 
are empowered to take actions in this regard. The [AU] agrees 
with the Panel that the intervention of Regional Organiza-
tions should be with the approval of the Security Council; alt-
hough in certain situations, such approval could be granted 
“after the fact” in circumstances requiring urgent action. In 
such cases, the UN should assume responsibility for financing 
such operations . . . . 
With regard to the use of force, it is important to comply 
scrupulously with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Char-
ter, which authorize the use of force only in cases of legiti-
mate self-defense. In addition, the Constitutive Act of the Af-
rican Union, in its Article 4 (h), authorizes intervention in 
grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. Consequently, any recourse to force out-
side the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter and Arti-
cle 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act should be prohibited.103 
The AU’s position implies two things. First, it shows an insist-
ence by the AU that “even if regional organizations may decide 
to intervene . . . regional deliberations must take precedence 
                                                                                                                                     
2004) (by Anand Panyarachun et al.). The Panel affirmed that “[t]here is a 
growing recognition that the issue . . . [does not surround] ‘the right to inter-
vene’ of any State, but the ‘responsibility to protect’”; every state bears this 
right “when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe[s]—mass 
murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, deliberate 
starvation, and exposure to disease.” Id. ¶ 201. The Panel also recognized 
that “while sovereign governments have the primary responsibility to protect 
their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling 
to do so, that responsibility should be taken by the wider international com-
munity . . . .” Id. 
 102. See AU, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the 
United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus,” A.U. Doc. Ext/EX.CL/2 (VII) 
(Mar. 7–8, 2005) [hereinafter The Ezulwini Consensus]. 
 103. The Ezulwini Consensus, supra note 102, at 6. 
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over global deliberations, even when relevant regional bodies 
decide not to act or are incapable of acting effectively.”104 Sec-
ond, this position implies that “until the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security,”105 the AU is willing to take the primary respon-
sibility without prior authorization from the Security Council. 
For example, in the Darfur case, the AU played a primary role 
in resolving the internal armed conflict.106 It is reported that 
when discussing how best to respond to the crisis in Darfur, 
especially in the event the Sudanese government continues fail, 
the Security Council members from the United States, United 
Kingdom, Germany, Chile, and Spain referred to the AU as 
“bearing the primary responsibility.”107 Francis Deng “argued 
that since the Sudanese government had declared its hostility 
to U.N. intervention, the best way forward was to encourage 
the AU to establish a presence in Darfur with the Sudanese 
government’s consent.”108 Although the AU’s regional mecha-
nism was used to block collective action through the Security 
Council, Deng’s viewpoint was “supported by . . . African states 
primarily concerned with averting [unsolicited] international 
intervention.”109 This episode reveals that the international 
community has acknowledged and recognized that the AU has 
taken the primary responsibility to deal with issues of peace 
and security in the region. 
                                                                                                                                     
 104. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 80. 
 105. See U.N. Charter, art. 51. 
 106. See Suyash Paliwal, The Primacy of Regional Organizations in Inter-
national Peacekeeping: The African Example, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 185, 198–201 
(2010–2011). 
 107. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 79; see also S.C. Res. 1556, ¶ 2, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004) (The Security Council “[e]ndorses the de-
ployment of international monitors, including the protection force envisioned 
by the African Union, to the Darfur region of Sudan under the leadership of 
the African Union and urges the international community to support these 
efforts . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 108. BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 79 (citing Rep. of the Secretary-General on 
Internally Displaced Pers., Specific Groups and Individuals: Mass Exoduses 
and Displaced Persons, Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶¶ 22, 26, 36, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/8 (Sept. 27, 2004) (by Francis M. Deng)). 
 109. See BELLAMY, supra note 61, at 79–80; see also AU, Decision on Darfur, 
¶ 4, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.54(III) Rev.1 (July 6–8, 2004) (The Assembly 
“[s]tress[ing] that the [AU] should continue to lead these efforts to address 
the crisis in Darfur and that the International Community should continue to 
support this efforts [sic].”). 
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The relationship between the AU and the Security Council 
remains speculative with regard to the AU’s right to intervene. 
Nevertheless, as the recent history has shown, the AU has re-
served for itself the primary responsibility to deal with war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, which threaten 
peace and security in the African region.110 This is evident in 
the codification of the right to intervene in the Constitutive Act 
of the AU—the very instrument that created the AU.111 Addi-
tionally, the AU is in close proximity with the internal armed 
conflicts in Africa. Thus, the AU has a greater claim than the 
Security Council on the issues of international crimes that are 
committed in the territory of the AU member states and that 
threaten the regional peace and security. 
B. The Institutional Organs of the AU Put in Place for the Exer-
cise of the AU’s Right to Intervene 
This section describes the institutional organs of the AU that 
are structured toward realizing the AU’s duty to intervene. 
Several new organs were established112 to enable the AU to 
meet these new objectives and to strengthen what others have 
termed a “very ambitious experiment based on the [European 
Union] model.”113 The description of the organs of the AU will 
show that the AU as a whole has been structured toward inter-
vention. 
Consistent with the sovereign equality principle, the annual 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government (“AU Assembly”) 
is the supreme organ that debates and decides issues, and 
adopts resolutions, just as it had under the OAU.114 It is this 
                                                                                                                                     
 110. Constitutive Act art. 4(h), (j). 
 111. Art. 2 of the Constitutive Act states that “[t]he [AU] is hereby estab-
lished in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” Constitutive Act art. 2; 
see also Bryan D. Kreykes, Toward a Model of Humanitarian Intervention: 
The Legality of Armed Intervention to Address Zimbabwe’s Operation Mu-
rambatsvina, 32 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 335, 346 (2010). 
 112. See Constitutive Act art. 5 (listing the organs of the AU). 
 113. KARNS & MINGST, supra note 6, at 205. 
 114. See Constitutive Act art. 6; see also OAU Charter art. 8. Article 8 of the 
OAU Charter states that “[t]he [OAU Assembly] shall be the supreme organ 
of the Organization. It shall, subject to the provision of this Charter, discuss 
matters of common concern to Africa with a view to coordinating and harmo-
nizing the general policy of the Organization. It may in addition review the 
structure, functions and acts of all the organs and any specialized agencies 
which may be created in accordance with the present Charter.” Id. 
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body that must approve calls for AU intervention and give di-
rections to the relevant organs established to deal with peace 
and security in Africa. To implement its decisions, the Consti-
tutive Act allows the AU Assembly to delegate its powers to 
any of its organs115 and to establish any other organs not listed 
in the Constitutive Act.116 It is on this basis that the PSC117 
was established. The PSC is required to work with many or-
gans within the AU, which are in turn designed to support the 
PSC in playing its role of preventing conflicts and international 
crimes. These are organs are discussed below in this section. 
The PSC is the primary decision-making organ established to 
prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts in Africa.118 Its “collec-
tive security and early-warning arrangements facilitate [a] 
timely and efficient response to conflict” situations.119 The AU 
Assembly established the PSC because of the concerns “that 
conflicts have forced millions of our people, including women 
and children, into a drifting life as refugees and internal dis-
placed persons, deprived of their means and livelihood, human 
dignity and hope.”120 Therefore, the PSC Protocol gives broad 
powers to the PSC in comparison to the Central Organ of the 
OAU,121 which was the predecessor of the PSC.122 These powers 
include making recommendations to the AU Assembly “pursu-
ant to article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, and intervention on 
behalf of the [AU], in a Member State in respect of grave cir-
                                                                                                                                     
 115. See Constitutive Act art. 9(2). 
 116. Id. art. 5(2). 
 117. The PSC Protocol is rooted in Art. 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act and 
determines that the PSC shall be “a collective security and early warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict situation in 
Africa.” PSC Protocol art. 2(1). The PSC is therefore the primary organ of the 
AU tasked with conflict resolution and prevention on the continent. See id; 
see also Hennie Strydom, Peace and Security under the African Union, 28 S. 
AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 59, 62 (2003). 
 118. PSC Protocol art. 2(1). 
 119. Id. See Strydom, supra note 117, at 62. 
 120. PSC Protocol pmbl. 
 121. See PSC Protocol art. 3 (listing the objectives of the PSC). The Central 
Organ was established by the OAU Declaration on a Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution (“Cairo Declaration”). See OAU, 
Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the Estab-
lishment Within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Manage-
ment and Resolution, ¶ 17, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX) (June 28-30, 
1993). 
 122. PSC Protocol pmbl. 
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cumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity as defined in international conventions and instru-
ments.”123 The AU Assembly recognizes that the “observance of 
human rights” and “the rule of law” are essential for the pre-
vention of conflicts.124 In achieving its objectives, the PSC seeks 
guidance from the Constitutive Act, the U.N. Charter, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.125 The PSC Protocol 
also gives the PSC a wide variety of functions in a wide range 
of areas, including the promotion of peace and stability in Afri-
ca and intervention pursuant to the Constitutive Act.126 
The PSC acts on behalf of the AU member states that are 
parties to the PSC Protocol.127 The PSC is composed of fifteen 
members, ten of which are elected for a term of two years, 
while the remaining five members are elected for a term of 
three years.128 The members are elected by the Assembly ac-
cording to specifically defined criteria.129 The criteria consider 
moral obligations, which include the history of a particular 
state in curtailing the effects of conflict on the continent, the 
states’ own histories that relate to peace and security, and the 
commitment to the principles of the AU, as contained in the 
Constitutive Act.130 
Another organ instrumental in the exercise of the AU’s right 
to intervene is the Panel of the Wise, which was established to 
support and to advise the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission in their efforts in the areas of conflict prevention 
and in “the promotion and maintenance of peace, security, and 
stability in Africa.”131 The Panel of the Wise is composed of 
“five highly respected African personalities from various seg-
ments of society who have made outstanding contribution to 
the cause of peace, security and development on the conti-
                                                                                                                                     
 123. See id. art. 7(e). 
 124. See id. at 3. 
 125. See id. art. 4. 
 126. Id. art. 6. 
 127. See id. art. 7(2). 
 128. Id. art. 5(1). 
 129. Id. art. 5(2). 
 130. See id. art. 5(2)(a)–(e). 
 131. See id. art. 11(3); see also Ademola Jegede, The African Union Peace 
and Security Architecture: Can the Panel of the Wise Make a Difference?, 9 
AFT. HUM. RTS. L.J. 409, 409 (2009) (examining the necessity to have the 
Panel of the Wise in the AU peace and security architecture). 
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nent.”132 “The Panel meets as often as the circumstances may 
require, or at least three times a year.”133 It “may also sit at 
any time at the request of the [PSC] or [of] the Chairperson of 
the [AU] Commission.”134 One scholar has correctly argued that 
“such impromptu sittings” are appropriate, “considering the 
spontaneous nature of conflicts” that arise in Africa.135 
The PSC Protocol also mandates the Chairperson of the AU 
Commission to bring to the attention of the PSC any matter 
that “may threaten peace, security, and stability in the conti-
nent.”136 The AU Commission is the secretariat of the AU 
whose structures, functions, and regulations are determined by 
the AU Assembly.137 It is composed of the Chairperson, the 
deputy to the Chairperson, and various commissioners.138 The 
AU Assembly has decided that the AU Commission must be 
transformed into the AU Authority “to strengthen the institu-
tional framework of the AU and to accelerate the economic and 
political integration of the continent.”139 This transformation is 
yet to come because the AU Assembly must still decide on the 
progress made by the AU Commission in dealing with this mat-
ter so far.140 To this end, the Chairperson of the Commission 
may use his or her office to “prevent potential conflicts.”141 
The Chairperson of the Commission also works closely with 
the Panel of the Wise and the regional mechanisms to prevent 
conflicts.142 The role of the Chairperson of the AU Commission 
with regard to peace and security matters is defined in the PSC 
Protocol.143 In this regard, the Chairperson of the AU Commis-
sion is required to “take all initiatives deemed appropriate to 
                                                                                                                                     
 132. PSC Protocol art. 11(2). 
 133. See Jegede, supra note 131, at 419; see also PSC Protocl art. 11(6). 
 134. See Jegede, supra note 131, at 419; see also PSC Protocol art. 11(4). 
 135. See Jegede, supra note 131, at 419. 
 136. PSC Protocol art. 10(2)(a). 
 137. Constitutive Act art. 20. 
 138. Id. art. 20(2). 
 139. AU, Decision on the Transformation of the AU Commission into the AU 
Authority, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.341 (XVI) (Jan. 30–31, 2011). 
 140. AU, Decision on the Transformation of the AU Commission into the AU 
Authority, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.372 (XVII) (Jun. 30–July 1, 2011) 
(the AU Assembly deciding to defer the consideration of the said item to the 
next ordinary session in early 2012). 
 141. PSC Protocol art. 10(2)(c). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. arts. 7, 10. 
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prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts” under the authority of 
the PSC and in consultation with all the parties involved.144 
Additionally, the Chairperson may bring to the Panel of the 
Wise any matter he or she deems that deserve the attention of 
the Panel.145 The Chairperson’s function regarding matters of 
peace and security also includes implementing and following 
up on the decisions of the PSC and those decisions taken by the 
AU Assembly in terms of Articles 4(h) and (j) of the Constitu-
tive Act.146 
The PSC Protocol also established the Continental Early 
Warning System (“Early Warning System”) to “facilitate the 
anticipation and prevention of conflicts.”147 The Early Warning 
System includes “the Situation Room,” which is “responsible for 
data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate ear-
ly warning indicator module” and for the “observation and 
monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked di-
rectly through appropriate means of communications to the 
Situation Room . . . .148 The Chairperson of the Commission is 
expected to use “the information gathered through the Early 
Warning System timeously to advise the [PSC] on potential 
conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and [to] 
recommend the best course of action.”149 
C. The Impediments That May Bar the AU from Exercising the 
Right to Intervene 
The AU functions on the basis of sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity, and non-interference, and intervention may not occur 
as easily as it sounds on paper. In this regard, a collective deci-
sion on the part of a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of the 
AU is required for an intervention.150 To ascertain the chal-
lenges faced by the AU in the exercise of its right to intervene, 
one must examine the relevant decisions and resolution adopt-
ed by the AU Assembly since the AU’s inception. At the same 
time, these resolutions and decisions also show the positions 
that the AU has taken to date when it comes to internal con-
                                                                                                                                     
 144. Id. art. 10(1). 
 145. Id. art. 10(2)(b). 
 146. Id. art. 10(3). 
 147. Id. art. 12(1). 
 148. Id. art. 12(2). 
 149. Id. art. 12(5). 
 150. See Constitutive Act art. 7(1). 
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flicts in Africa. It must be recalled that the AU was established 
with a view to eradicate all forms of human rights violations as 
the African leaders recognized that there can be no peace with-
out ensuring that human rights are protected.151 
From this examination of the AU resolutions and decisions, 
the following observations can be made: First, the AU Assem-
bly does not tolerate internal conflicts arising from unconstitu-
tional changes of governments. This is reflected in the AU As-
sembly decision concerning Chad, where the AU Assembly “re-
call[ed] its rejection of any unconstitutional change in accord-
ance with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of 
the [AU] . . . and stress[ed] that no authority that comes to 
power by force will be recognized by the AU.”152 As a result, the 
AU Assembly “[s]trongly condemn[ed] the attacks perpetrated 
by armed groups against the Chadian government and de-
mand[ed] an immediate end to [the] attacks . . . resulting [in] 
bloodshed.”153 The language used here by the AU Assembly is 
clear and leaves no doubt in the minds of the parties involved 
as to its position.154 The AU may even issue sanctions against a 
state that does not abide by the decisions and principles of the 
AU. For example, sanctions were passed on the Ivory Coast 
during the dispute over the results of the November 2010 pres-
idential elections.155 Consequently, the Ivory Coast was sus-
pended from participation in the activities of the AU “until 
such a time the democratically elected President effectively as-
sumes State Power.”156 Further, although the language was not 
                                                                                                                                     
 151. See id. at 35 (stating that the OAU Heads of State and Government 
were “[c]onscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes 
a major impediment to the . . . need to promote peace, security and stability . 
. . .”). 
 152. See AU, Decision on the Situation in Chad, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assem-
bly/AU/Dec.188 (X) (Jan. 31–Feb. 2, 2008). 
 153. Id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). 
 154. See AU, Decision on the Report of the Peace and Sec. Council on its Ac-
tivities and on the State of Peace and Security in Africa, ¶ 9, A.U. Doc. As-
sembly/AU/Dec.252 (XIII) (July 3, 2009) (supporting the decisions of the PSC 
on the unconstitutional changes that occurred in Mauritania, Guinea, and 
Madagascar). 
 155. Peace and Sec. Council  of the AU (PSC), Communiqué of the 252d 
Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, ¶ 4, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.1 
(CCLII) (Dec. 9, 2010). 
 156. Id. This PSC decision was endorsed by the AU Assembly. See AU, De-
cision on the Report of the Peace and Security Council on its Activities and the 
State of Peace and Sec. in Africa, ¶ 22, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.338 (XVI) 
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as strong as in the situations in Chad and Ivory Coast, the AU 
Assembly did stress “the need for those involved in [human 
rights] violations to be held accountable” following the violence 
caused by the dispute of the presidential elections results in 
Kenya.157 
Second, the decisions adopted by the AU Assembly also 
demonstrate that the heads of state still have not relinquished 
their fear of criticizing each other, and that their reaction de-
pends on a state involved in particular conflicts and also on the 
nature of the conflict.158 This is evident in the crisis in Sudan 
and the way the AU handled the situation.159 The language 
used in the decisions of the AU Assembly pertaining to the cri-
sis in Darfur is lax compared to that of the decisions stated for 
the situations in Chad and Ivory Coast.160 Here, the AU As-
sembly “[r]eiterat[ed] its serious concern over the prevailing 
situation in the Darfur Region”161 and “welcome[d] the 
measures taken by the [Government of Sudan] to protect the 
civilian populations, facilitate the work of the humanitarian 
agencies and NGOs and provide them with unrestricted access 
                                                                                                                                     
(Jan. 31, 2011). The AU Assembly made the following decision with regard to 
the situation in Ivory Coast: The AU Assembly “[expresses] its deep concern 
at the prevailing crisis in Cote d’Ivoire following the 2nd round of the presi-
dential elections held on 28 November 2010, [endorses] the PSC Communi-
qués and [commends] ECOWAS, the AU Commission and all the African and 
international leaders involved in the search for a peaceful solution to the cri-
sis. The Assembly [encourages] the AU Commission and ECOWAS to contin-
ue with their efforts to find, as soon as possible, a solution that respects de-
mocracy and the will of the people as expressed on 28 November 2010 and 
preserves peace in the country.”  Id. 
 157. AU, Decision on the Situation in Kenya Following the Presidential 
Election of Dec. 27, 2007, ¶¶ 3, 5, Assembly/AU/Dec.187 (X) (Jan. 31–Feb. 2, 
2008) (where the AU Assembly “strongly urg[ed] the parties to commit them-
selves to a peaceful dialogue in conformity with the rule of law”) (emphasis 
added). 
 158. See AU, Decision on Darfur, ¶ 2, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.54 (III) 
(July 6–8, 2004) (noting that “even though the humanitarian situation in 
Darfur is serious, it cannot be defined as genocide”) [hereinafter Decision on 
Darfur]. 
 159. Id. 
 160. See notes 156 and 157 supra, where the language used by the AU As-
sembly against Chad is strong as compared to the language used against Su-
dan. The inference therefore is that because the Chad situation involved an 
armed group against the government as compared to the situation in Sudan 
where it is the government of Sudan at the forefront of the conflict. Id. 
 161. Decision on Darfur, supra note 158, ¶ 1. 
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to the affected populations.”162 This is in contrast with reports 
that the Sudanese government did not want to cooperate and 
that it was one of the parties that targeted civilians in this con-
flict.163 While the AU sent the AU Mission in Darfur164 to par-
ticipate in peacekeeping, it avoided criticizing President Al 
Bashir or the way he dealt with the conflict as the leader.165 
Third, when the international community has intervened on 
African issues to protect the nationals, the AU has shown dis-
satisfaction. For example, when the ICC issued arrest warrants 
against President Al Bashir, the AU Assembly adopted several 
decisions requesting that AU member states should not cooper-
ate with the ICC.166 The AU even went as far as examining the 
                                                                                                                                     
 162. Id. ¶ 3. 
 163. On the history of Darfur, see JULIE FLINT & ALEXANDER DE WAAL, 
DARFUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF A LONG WAR 112 (2005) (noting that when U.N. 
agencies attempted to intervene, the Khartoum government obstructed out-
side investigation and blocked relief efforts); see also Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n 
of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General, Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004, at 3, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 
(Jan. 25, 2005) (by Antonio Cassesse et al.). 
 164. “In 2006, the AU deployed a peacekeeping mission to Sudan, which 
was replaced in 2008 by the unprecedented joint African Union/United Na-
tions Hybrid operation in Darfur (“UNAMID”), currently the largest peace-
keeping mission in the world.” UNAMID Background, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2012). UNAMID’s mandate has been extended since then, 
most recently until July 31, 2012, and currently stands at 92 percent of its 
authorized troop strength of almost 20,000. See UNAMID Facts and Figures, 
UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2012). 
 165. There is no resolution or decision of the AU criticizing Sudan’s han-
dling of the situation. 
 166. See AU, Decision on the Application by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the Indictment of the President of the Republic of 
the Sudan, ¶¶ 1, 5, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 221 (XII) (Feb. 1–3, 2009) 
(requesting “the Commission to convene a meeting of the African States that 
are parties to the Rome Statute . . . to exchange views on the work of the ICC 
in relation to Africa, in particular, in light of the processes initiated against 
African personalities, and to submit recommendations thereon taking into 
account all relevant elements”); AU, Decision on the Meeting of African States 
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, ¶ 10, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.245 
(XIII) (July 1–3, 2009) (deciding not to cooperate with the ICC in the execu-
tion of the arrest warrant issued against Al Bashir of Sudan); AU, Decision 
on the Implementation of the Decisions on the International Criminal Court, 
¶¶ 4, 5, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.334 (XVI) (Jan. 30–31, 2011), (regretting 
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possibility of the AfCHPR having the jurisdiction to deal with 
international crimes.167 This is significant because the AU As-
sembly has never taken any adverse decisions against the 
member states that referred the situations to the ICC to prose-
cute the opposition parties.168 It is therefore questionable that 
the AU would claim that the ICC is targeting Africans.169 This 
is also reflected by the AU Assembly’s decision to target the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, which is alleged to have committed 
atrocities in the Great Lakes Region, particularly in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), the Central African Republic, 
and Southern Sudan.170 This decision should be commended for 
                                                                                                                                     
“the Decisions . . . of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC . . . informing the 
U.N. Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties of the Rome 
Statute (ASP) about the visit of President [Al Bashir] to [Chad and Kenya] . . 
.” and deciding that “by receiving President Bashir, [Chad and Kenya] were 
implementing various AU Assembly Decisions on the warrant of arrest issued 
by the ICC against President Bashir as well as acting in pursuit of peace and 
stability in their respective regions”); AU, Decision on the Implementations of 
the Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/670 
(XIX), ¶ 6, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 366 (XVII) (June 30–July 1, 2011). 
(noting “that the warrant of arrest . . . seriously complicates the efforts aimed 
at finding a negotiated political solution to the crisis in Libya” and deciding 
that member states “shall not cooperate in the execution of the arrest war-
rant”); AU, Decision on the Implementation of the Decisions on the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, ¶ 7, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.419 (XIX) (July 15–
16, 2012) (encouraging the African State Parties to the Rome Statute and 
African non-state parties “to consider concluding bilateral agreements on the 
immunities of their Senior State officials”). 
 167. See AU, Decision on the Implementations of the Assembly Decisions on 
the International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/670 (XIX), ¶ 8, A.U. Doc. As-
sembly/AU/Dec. 366 (XVII) (June 30–July 1, 2011). 
 168. There are no decisions or resolutions adopted by the AU that condemn 
the DRC and Uganda for referring the situations in their respective territo-
ries to the ICC for investigations and prosecutions. 
 169. For further discussion on whether the ICC is targeting Africans, see 
Ntombizozuko Dyani, Is the International Criminal Court Targeting Africa? 
Reflections on the Enforcement of International Criminal Law in Africa, in 
AFRICA AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 185 (Vincent 
Nmehielle ed., 2012). 
 170. See Annex II to Letter Dated Sept. 15, 2009 from the Permanent Ob-
server of the African Union to the United Nations Addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, Plan of Action, ¶ 8(ix), U.N. Doc. S/2009/461 (Sept. 
15, 2009) (by Lila Hanitra Ratsifandrihamanana) (renewing “efforts . . . to 
neutralize the [LRA] and [to] bring to an end its atrocities and destabilizing 
atrocities in the [Democratic Republic of Congo], Southern Sudan, and Cen-
tral African Republic”); see also AU, Decision on the Report of the Peace and 
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dealing with human rights atrocities that include the use of 
child soldiers and sexual slavery, even if the motivation re-
mains questionable due to its exclusive focus on crimes com-
mitted by the opposition group. Therefore, although the AU 
still adheres to the principles of non-interference, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity with regard to its leaders—”brother 
leaders,”171 depending on the situation—it still passes resolu-
tions to condemn human rights violations. Moreover, the AU 
has, in some instances, intervened in the territory of some 
member states even though the intervention was not based on 
the right to intervene as contemplated in the Constitutive 
Act.172 
III. THE AU INTERVENTIONS 
The AU has not conducted extensive interventions on the 
continent despite the significant need for intervention. Never-
theless, it has intervened in Burundi to build peace, intervened 
in Darfur to enable the establishment of a more robust U.N. 
peace operation and to monitor the humanitarian crisis effec-
tively, and intervened in Somalia to coordinate efforts to ad-
vance the cause of peace.173 Although these interventions are 
evidence of the AU’s ambition to handle issues that threaten 
peace and security, and to halt gross human rights violations in 
the continent, the AU is faced with challenges that include lack 
of funds and an unwillingness of states to deploy troops in are-
as that are deemed too dangerous.174 Further, the interventions 
are exercised with the state’s consent as opposed to the right to 
intervene without state consent.175 
                                                                                                                                     
Security Council on Its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Afri-
ca, ¶ 21, A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec. 369 (XVII) (June 30–July 1, 2011) (wel-
coming the initiatives taken by the AU Commission on the issue of the LRA, 
and requesting the AU Council to give early authorization for the envisaged 
operation against the LRA). 
 171. This term is used by the AU Assembly to refer to the late Colonel Gad-
dafi, and the same term was also used during the OAU era to refer to the 
African heads of state. 
 172. See infra Part IV. 
 173. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 174. See infra Part IV.A–C. 
 175. See Lieblich, supra note 1, at 370–71 (arguing that the AU exercises its 
right to intervene in terms of Art. 4(h) of the Constitutive Act against the will 
of its member states). 
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A. AU Mission in Burundi 
Like its neighboring state Rwanda, Burundi has a population 
made up of Hutus (85%) and Tutsis (14%), and the power 
struggle between these groups of people has been the same 
since the country’s independence.176 The current conflict in Bu-
rundi began in the latter half of 1993, when President Melchior 
Ndadaye, a Hutu, was assassinated by “soldiers from the Tutsi-
dominated government army.”177 Mediation initiatives by for-
mer presidents Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Nelson Mandela 
(South Africa) resulted in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi,178 which was signed by the parties in-
volved, including the Burundi government and representatives 
of the principal Hutu and Tutsi political parties.179 The agree-
ment provided for power sharing and for a transitional period 
of thirty-six months, during which national assembly and pres-
idential elections were to take place.180 Ceasefire agreements 
were signed between the transition government of Burundi and 
two Hutu rebel groups.181 However, despite the progress that 
had been made, one rebel group refused to engage in the peace 
process and continued its attacks against government forces.182 
During this time, the PSC was not yet operational.183 As a re-
sult, the OAU Central Organ approved the deployment of the 
                                                                                                                                     
 176. See Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and 
Participation in Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 49, 51, 65 (1995). 
 177. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 44–45; see Tim Murithi, The African Un-
ion’s Evolving Role in Peace Operations: The African Union Mission in Bu-
rundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and The African Union Mission in 
Somalia, 17 AFR. SECURITY REV. 70 (2008). 
 178. See Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, at 2, 
Aug. 28, 2000, available at 
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/profiles/Burundi/arusha.pdf [hereinafter Arusha 
Agreement]. 
 179. Id. at 1. 
 180. Arusha Agreement, supra note 178, Protocol II, art. 13. 
 181. Stef Vandeginste, Power-Sharing, Conflict and Transition in Burundi: 
Twenty Years of Trial and Error, 3 AFRICA SPECTRUM 63, 72 (2009). 
 182. Cent. Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Mgmt. and 
Resolution at Heads of State and Gov’t Level, AU, Communiqué, ¶ 1, A.U. 
Doc. Central Organ/MEC/AHG/Comm. (VII) (Feb. 3, 2003) [hereinafter AU 
Conflict Prevention VII]. 
 183. The PSC was inaugurated in 2004. See U.N. Secretary-General’s, Sec-
retary-General’s Message to the Inauguration of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union (May 25, 2004), 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=943 (congratulating “the 
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African Mission in Burundi (“AMIB”) to support its peace pro-
cess on February 3, 2003.184 AMIB “was the first operation 
wholly initiated, planned, and executed by the AU.”185 One of 
AMIB’s tasks was to protect returning politicians who would 
take part in the transitional government.186 AMIB was also in-
volved in creating conditions that would allow internally dis-
placed persons and refugees living in the eight Burundian 
provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania to return to 
their homes.187 The objectives of the mission also included over-
seeing the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreements and 
implementing conditions that would be favorable for the estab-
lishment of a U.N. peacekeeping mission.188 South Africa, 
Mozambique, and Ethiopia pledged to send their troops for 
AMIB,189 with South Africa as the Lead Nation.190 
It is argued that despite challenges faced by AMIB during its 
operation, it eventually “succeeded in de-escalating a potential-
ly volatile situation, which would likely have escalated to a vio-
lent conflict in its absence.”191 It is in this regard that “AMIB 
showed that the AU could play a significant role in stabilizing 
situations on the ground prior to U.N. deployment.”192 But, de-
spite its relative success, AMIB faced financial constraints in 
its mission.193 As a result, the AU “decided that troop-
contributing [states] would be responsible for the first two 
months of deployment, pending AU reimbursement, with the 
AU assuming the financial responsibility at the end of this pe-
riod.”194 Thus, during the launch of the mission, only South Af-
                                                                                                                                     
members of the African Union on this historic day,” which marked the inau-
guration of the PSC). 
 184. AU Conflict Prevention VII, supra note 182, ¶ 2. 
 185. Murithi, supra note 177, 75. 
 186. See Cent. Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Mgmt. and 
Resolution at Heads of State and Gov’t Level, AU, Communiqué, ¶ 5(iii), A.U. 
Doc. Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm. (XCI) (Apr. 2, 2003). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. ¶ 5(ii). 
 189. Id. ¶ 3. 
 190. Id. ¶ 2. 
 191. Murithi supra note 177, 75. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Bu-
rundi, ¶ 62, U.N. Doc. S/2004/210 (Mar. 16, 2004); see also Omorogbe, supra 
note 23, at 46. 
 194. Id. 
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rica was deployed in Burundi even though Ethiopia and 
Mozambique had also given their commitment to send their 
troops.195 It was only after the United States and the United 
Kingdom contributed funds to Ethiopia and Mozambique that 
they were able to deploy their forces.196 
AMIB fulfilled “its primary objective” in March 2004.197 The 
Security Council authorized the deployment of the U.N. Opera-
tion in Burundi (“ONUB”) in May 2004.198 The former AMIB 
troops were also incorporated into ONUB,199 and “[d]uring the 
mission, the Burundi government’s transitional process was 
successfully concluded in September 2005, after democratic 
elections for the National Assembly and the Presidency, and 
[also] after the installation of a government in line with the 
power-sharing agreements outlined in the Arusha Agree-
ment.”200 By December 2006, ONUB had completed its mis-
sion.201 
B. AU Mission in Darfur 
It is argued that the armed conflict in Darfur became the 
“AU’s most significant test to date.”202 Following the escalation 
of the armed conflict, the Chadian government mediated be-
tween the Sudanese government and the two rebel groups: Su-
dan Liberation Movement (“SLM”) and Justice and Equality 
Movement (“JEM”). The mediation process led to the signing of 
a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (“N’djamena Agree-
ment”) in April 2004 between the Sudanese government, the 
SLM, and the JEM.203 The N’djamena Agreement provided for, 
                                                                                                                                     
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. See Id. at 47 (“In March 2004, the PSC stated that AMIB had fulfilled 
its primary objective—the creation of a ‘conducive environment’ for the de-
ployment of a UN peacekeeping mission—and requested the UN to take 
over.”); see also Murithi supra note 177, 75 (“AMIB’s crucial role in this case 
was to create conditions through which peace, albeit fragile, could be built in 
the country. By the end of its mission AMIB had succeeded in establishing 
relative peace to most provinces in Burundi . . . .”). 
 198. S.C. Res. 1545, ¶¶ 2, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1545 (May 21, 2004). 
 199. See Murithi, supra note 177, 76. 
 200. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 47. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Murithi, supra note 177, 76. 
 203. See AU, Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation 
in Sudan (Crisis in Darfur), ¶ 18, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/2(V) (Apr. 13, 2004); see 
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among other provisions, the establishment of a Ceasefire 
Commission composed of two high-ranking officers from the 
parties, the Chadian mediation, and the involvement of the in-
ternational community in the mediation process.204 
On May 28, 2004, under the backing of the AU, the parties 
concluded an “Agreement on the Modalities for the Establish-
ment of the Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Ob-
servers in Darfur.”205 In short, this agreement held that in or-
der to implement the provisions in the N’Djamena Agreement, 
an AU Monitoring Mission composed of observers from the par-
ties, the Chadian mediation, AU member states, and other rep-
resentatives of the International Community would be the op-
erational arm of the Ceasefire Commission.206 This resulted in 
AU’s decision to establish an AU Observer Mission (“AMIS I”), 
the purpose of which was to protect civilian population and to 
monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement.207 The U.N. 
Security Council gave its support to the AU’s active and lead 
role in Darfur and to the deployment of AU monitors, including 
a protection force.208 The government of Sudan, “the SLM and 
the JEM also signed the Abuja Protocol on Humanitarian and 
Security Issues” (“Abuja Protocols”) on November 9, 2004.209 In 
                                                                                                                                     
also Robert P. Barnidge Jr., The United Nations and the African Union: As-
sessing a Partnership for Peace in Darfur, 14 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 93 
(2009); Omorogbe, supra note 22; Marten Zwanenburg, Regional Organisa-
tions and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Three Recent 
Regional African Peace Operations, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 483, 494 
(2006). 
 204. Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur art. 3, 
Apr. 8, 2004, available at 
http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=14149. 
 205. See AU, Agreement on the Modalities for the Establishment of the 
Ceasefire Commission and the Deployment of Observers in Darfur, May 28, 
2004, available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/af/profiles/sudan/darfur/cfc/agreement.pdf. 
 206. Id. § II(4). 
 207. PSC, AU, Communiqué of the Solemn Launching of the Peace and Sec. 
Council, § A(6), A.U. Doc. PSC/AHG/Comm. (X) (May 25, 2004) [hereinafter 
PSC Communiqué X]. 
 208. See S.C. Res. 1556, supra note 107, ¶ 2. 
 209. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49; see Protocol Between the Government 
of the Sudan (Gos), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the 
Justice Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Humanitarian 
Situation in Darfur in Accordance with the N’Djamena Agreement, Nov. 9, 
2004, available at 
38 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
the Protocols, “the parties requested the ‘AU to urgently take 
the necessary steps to strengthen AMIS I on the ground, with 
the requisite mandate to ensure more effective monitoring of 
the commitments . . . .’”210 
On May 25, 2004, the PSC approved AMIS I,211 and 
“[i]nitially, AMIS I had sixty military observers (“MILOBs”) 
and 300 MILOB protectors.”212 Commentators have observed 
that the small size of AMIS I was insufficient because it failed 
to provide the “full coverage of the Darfur region,” resulting in 
“ceasefire violations on all sides” and the deterioration of the 
security situation.213 In response, the PSC decided to create an 
enhanced mission, which became known as AMIS II. At this 
time, AMIS II’s mandate and resources were strengthened 
from those of its predecessor, and the PSC expanded the size of 
AMIS II.214 The Security Council also supported the increased 
mandate of AMIS II.215 In addition to monitoring compliance 
with ceasefire agreements, AMIS II was mandated “to contrib-
ute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian 
relief and . . . the return of [internally displaced persons] and 
refugees to their homes . . . .”216 Further, AMIS II could 
“[p]rotect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat 
and in the immediate vicinity . . . .”217 
Despite the commendable changes made to the AMIS II, 
commentators have noted that the AU’s lack of resources pre-
vented the AMIS II from effectively carrying out its reinforced 
mandate.218 Because of the challenges arising from the lack of 
                                                                                                                                     
http://ochaonline.un.org/OchaLinkClick.aspx?link=ocha&docid=14152 [here-
inafter Protocol of Sudan]. 
 210. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49 (quoting Protocol of Sudan, supra note 
214). 
 211. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49; see PSC Communiqué X, supra note 
208, § A(6). 
 212. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49; see AU, Briefing Note on the Renewal 
of the Mandate of the AU Mission in The Sudan (AMIS), ¶ 4, A.U. Doc. 
PSC/PR/2 (XLII) (Oct. 20, 2005). 
 213. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49; Zwanenburg, supra note 203, at 495. 
 214. See PSC, AU, Communiqué, ¶ 7, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII) (Oct. 
20, 2004) [hereinafter PSC Communiqué XVII]; see also PSC, AU, Communi-
qué, ¶ 9, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (XXVIII) (Apr. 28, 2005). 
 215. S.C. Res. 1574, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1574 (Nov. 19 2004). 
 216. PSC Communiqué XVII, supra note 214, ¶ 4. 
 217. Id. ¶ 6. 
 218. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 49, 53; Zwanenburg, supra note 203, 
at 495. 
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resources in early 2006, the PSC agreed to a transition from an 
AU to a U.N. force.219 This led to a number of resolutions that 
established the AU/U.N. hybrid operation in Darfur 
(“UNAMID”) as a joint peace support mission with a mandate 
to protect civilians derived from Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter.220 UNAMID assumed the mandate from AMIS II on De-
cember 31, 2007.221 This meant that the U.N. also assumed fi-
nancial responsibility for the cost of AMIS forces, operating 
now under the single command of the U.N.222 There are differ-
ing opinions about the effectiveness of AU and U.N. efforts 
through UNAMID.223 One commentator has noted that the sit-
uation in Darfur will ultimately depend on the ability of the 
parties to reach a political settlement.224 UNAMID was extend-
ed for one year until July 31, 2012, while welcoming the inten-
tion of the Secretary-General and the AU to review the number 
uniformed personnel required for effectiveness.225 The Security 
                                                                                                                                     
 219. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 50 (noting that the PSC supported the 
transition to a U.N. force as a result of “uncertainties regarding the financial 
stability” in the AU); see also, PSC, AU, Communiqué, ¶¶ 2–5, A.U. Doc. 
PSC/PR/Comm. (XLV) (Jan. 12, 2006); PSC, AU, Communiqué, ¶¶ 5–6, A.U. 
Doc. PSC/MIN/Comm. (XLVI) (Mar. 10, 2006). 
 220. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 51; see also, PSC, AU, Communiqué 
on the Situation in Darfur, ¶ 8, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXIX) (June 22, 
2007); see also S.C. Res. 1769, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1769 (July 31, 2007). 
 221. G.A. Res. 62/232A, ¶¶ 43–44, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/232A (Dec. 22, 
2007). 
 222. Id; S.C. Res. 1769, supra note 220, ¶¶ 6–8. For a discussion of the cost 
of the UNAMID resources, see Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 51–52. 
 223. See Murithi, supra note 177, 79 (questioning this “new relationship” 
between the UN and the AU in this regard (UNAMID), arguing that “[i]t is 
too early to pass a definitive judgment on this emerging hybrid partnership,” 
and noting that “[t]he AU has to remain vigilant to ensure that it does not 
descend into a relationship of hybrid paternalism”); Tom Kabau, The Respon-
sibility to Protect and the Role of Regional Organizations: An Appraisal of the 
African Union’s Interventions, 4 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 49, 67 (2012) (arguing 
that UNAMID “was more than a larger peacekeeping force, and not a robust 
enforcement force despite previous unsuccessful peacekeeping, continued civil 
war and mass atrocities”). Kabau attributes this to the fact that both the AU 
and the U.N. focused “on Sudan to consent to the deployment of troops and 
military equipment . . . .” Id. at 68. This was done despite the resolutions of 
the Security Council passed under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter that per-
mitted enforcement action (which did not sought consent from Sudan). Id. 
 224. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 53. 
 225. S.C. Res. 2003, ¶¶ 1–2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2003 (July 29, 2011). 
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Council has now decided to extend the UNAMID mandate “for 
a further 12 months” to July 31, 2013.226 
C. AU Mission in Somalia 
Since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, various at-
tempts have been made by both regional and international ac-
tors to find ways to resolve the armed conflict in Somalia.227 
Mark Malan, writing in the late 1990s, noted that prior inter-
national interventions in Somalia failed to produce desired re-
sults and have instead created reluctance on the part of the 
U.N. and the international community to become involved in 
African conflicts generally.228 This is due to the fact that inter-
national efforts have proven to be counterproductive because of 
the continuous instability in Somalia.229 In 2002, the Somali 
National Reconciliation Process took place “under the patron-
age of . . . Inter-Governmental Authority on Development” 
(“IGAD”) with the support of the U.N., AU, European Union 
(“EU”), and United States.230 This process is argued to have 
been successful since over twenty major Somali stakeholders 
signed “a statement on the Cessation of Hostilities and the 
Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Reconcilia-
                                                                                                                                     
 226. S.C. Res. 2063, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2063 (July 31, 2012). 
 227. See Peter Pham, Somalia: Where a State Isn’t a State, 35 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 133, 137 (2011) ( “Since the fall of President Siyad Barre and the 
coterminous collapse of the Somali state in 1991, regional and international 
actors have tried repeatedly to find ways to resolve the armed conflict in So-
malia by sponsoring extensive international peace processes, with the inten-
tion of instituting a functioning government in Mogadishu, Somalia.”). Pham 
also discusses the role played by the sub-regional organization Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (“IGAD”) supported by the Europe-
an Union and the United States in an attempt to solve the Somali conflict. 
Id.; see also, Mark Malan, The Crisis in External Response, in PEACE, PROFIT 
OR PLUNDER: THE PRIVATIZATION OF SECURITY IN WAR-TORN AFRICAN SOCIETIES 
37, 42–43 (Jakkie Cilliers & Peggy Mason eds., 1999) (discussing various in-
ternational responses to the Somali situation since 1991). 
 228. See Malan, supra note 227, at 43 (describing the events that occurred 
in Somalia, including the “humiliating scenes” of the bodies of the US soldiers 
being subjected to public acts of outrage, and arguing that “Somalia was thus 
a turning point at which international community lost all desire to experi-
ment further with ‘middle ground’ operations in Africa”). 
 229. See Pham, supra note 227, at 133–41 (discussing the reasons for Soma-
lia’s failure to find peace). 
 230. See Id. at 137; see also Omorogbe supra note 23, at 54 (describing the 
“Somalia National Reconciliation Process” that took place under IGAD). 
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tion Process on October 27, 2002.”231 This led to the adoption of 
a Transitional Federal Charter by the Transitional Federal 
Government (“TFG”) in February 2004.232 
While the TFG had found international acclaim, it found it 
difficult to operate within Mogadishu.233 The TFG was there-
fore “provisionally located in Baidoa, 250 kilometers northwest 
of Mogadishu.”234 The TFG lost its control of Somalia to the Un-
ion of Islamic Courts (“UIC”), 235 and “[i]n June 2006, the UIC 
seized control of Mogadishu, and began to extend its authority 
over a large part of Southern Somalia.”236 Also during that 
month, the UIC established the “Supreme Council of Islamic 
[C]ourts, with an executive and legislative authority.”237 TFG 
and UIC agreed to engage in dialogue, but armed conflict re-
sumed the following month, resulting in the UIC’s capture of 
parts of TFG’s areas of control.238 By September 2006, the UIC 
had also taken control of Kismayo, the largest city in the 
southern region of Somalia. 239 
The TFG received support from Ethiopia,240 while UIC also 
enjoyed foreign support.241 The intensification of the armed 
conflict in 2006 and the participation of foreign actors in-
creased the risk of a broader regional armed conflict.242 This led 
                                                                                                                                     
 231. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 54; see also Declaration on Cessation 
of Hostilities, and the Structures and Principles of the Somalia National Rec-
onciliation Process, Oct. 27, 2002, available at 
http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/somaliadeclaration.
pdf. 
 232. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 54. 
 233. Benjamin R. Farley, Calling a State: Somaliland and International 
Recognition, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 777, 784–85 (2010) (noting that the TFG 
had never entered Mogadishu, instead it operated in Kenya for several 
months). 
 234. See Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 55. 
 235. Pham, supra note 227, at 138 
 236. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 55; see Pham, supra note 227, at 138. 
 237. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 55. 
 238. See id. 
 239. November 2006 Monthly Forecast of Somalia, SECURITY COUNCIL 
REPORT (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-
forecast/2006-11/lookup_c_glKWLeMTIsG_b_2193657.php. 
 240. Colin Warbrick & Zeray W. Yihdego, Ethiopia’s Military Action Against 
the Union of Islamic Courts and Others in Somalia: Some Legal Implications, 
56 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 666, 667 (2007). 
 241. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary General on the Situation 
in Som., ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2007/115 (Feb. 28, 2007). 
 242. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. 
42 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:1 
to the Security Council establishing the IGAD Mission in So-
malia (“IGASOM”).243 According to Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, the 
IGASOM project was overtaken by events of December 20, 
2006 when a conflict broke out again between the TFG, assist-
ed by Ethiopian troops, and the UIC.244 Omorogbe also stated 
that “[a]lthough the TFG and Ethiopian troops forced the UIC 
to retreat, the TFG was not able to institute an effective au-
thority” in Somalia.245 The TFG’s reliance on the presence of 
Ethiopian forces raised issues regarding its legitimacy in the 
eyes of the civilian population and their endorsement of the 
UIC.246 In addition, the UIC still posed a serious threat to TFG 
through Shabaab, its well-armed and well-trained elite force.247 
The African Union Mission in Somalia (“AMISOM”) was 
eventually authorized by the PSC with the aim to support the 
TFG.248 The AMISOM’s mandate included support to the TFG 
institutions and the facilitation of the provisions of humanitar-
ian assistance to create conditions conducive for the long-term 
stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia.249 The AMISOM 
received support from the Security Council.250 The Security 
Council provided AMISOM with a mandate under Chapter VII 
of the U.N. Charter “to take all necessary measures as appro-
                                                                                                                                     
 243. S.C. Res. 1725, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1725 (Dec. 6, 2006). (The Securi-
ty Council “[d]etermin[ed] that the situation in Somalia constituted a threat 
to international peace and security in the region,” and “authorize[d] IGAD 
and [AU] [m]ember [s]tates to establish a protection and training mission in 
Somalia.”). Id. ¶ 3. 
 244. Omorogbe, supra note 23, at 55–56. 
 245. Id. at 55. 
 246. Id. at 55–56. 
 247. See Monitoring Group on Somalia, Rep. of the Monitoring Group on 
Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1724 (2006), ¶¶ 23–27, 35–
38, U.N. Doc. S/2007/436 (July 18, 2007) (by Bruno Schiemksy et al.); see also 
Warbrick & Yihdego, supra note 240, at 667, 670. 
 248. See Background and Political Developments, African Union Mission in 
Somalia, AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM_Background.htm 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2012); see also PSC, AU, Communiqué of the 69th Meet-
ing of the Peace and Sec. Council, ¶ 8, A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm (LXIX) (Jan. 
19, 2007). 
 249. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8. 
 250. S.C. Res. 1744, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1744 (Feb. 21, 2007) (The Securi-
ty Council decided to “authorize member States of the [AU] to establish for a 
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priate” to support dialogue and reconciliation, to offer protec-
tion to the TFG, and to contribute to the creation of security for 
humanitarian assistance.251 However, as in Darfur, commenta-
tors have noted that the AU and U.N. efforts in Somalia have 
been ineffective.252 Much of the difficulties have to do with the 
lack of financial resources by the AU and of commitment from 
the international community.253 Some of the difficulties faced 
by the AU are also caused by member states’ reluctance to con-
tribute their troops to a place such as Somalia, which is consid-
ered to be very dangerous.254 
However, the AU still continues to intervene in Somalia. An-
alysts are reported to have acknowledged that “the [AU] has 
done a better job of pacifying Mogadishu . . . than any other 
outside force, including 25,000 American troops in 1990s.255 
Further, the AU has recently received some assistance from 
member states such as Kenya,256 Ethiopia,257 and Sierra Leo-
ne.258 If the AMISOM succeeds, this may be a huge boost to the 
AU, as the internal armed conflict in Somalia has been ongoing 
for over twenty years. 
D. Assessment 
Interventions by the AU in the cases described above are 
conducted at the invitation or through the consent of the mem-
ber states pursuant to Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. This 
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means that the AU has not yet exercised its right to intervene 
as envisaged in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which does 
not require the consent of member states.259 This can be at-
tributed to the fact that under the Constitutive Act, a collective 
decision on the part of a two-thirds majority of the AU Assem-
bly is required for intervention purposes,260 and the AU only 
meets twice a year.261 Thus, intervention is not expected to take 
place if the two-thirds majority of the AU Assembly has not 
been reached, irrespective of whether international crimes 
mentioned in the Constitutive Act are being committed. Fur-
thermore, “given the continent’s traditional reluctance to en-
dorse interventionism . . . the likelihood of securing a two-
thirds majority in the face of a hostile host must be considered 
slim at best.”262 Therefore, invoking Article 4(h) authority in 
order to intervene in member states could only be “time-
consuming and fraught with political obstacles.”263 
It appears, then, that intervention may not happen at all or 
may happen too late, as was the case with Rwanda,264 Dar-
fur,265 and in Libya recently.266 On February 15, 2011, the 
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masses of Libya decided to hold a peaceful demonstration seek-
ing a regime change.267 The Gadhafi government responded 
through the use of force, leading to deaths and internal dis-
placement of Libyan civilians.268 The AU formed a panel to look 
into the situation in Libya only a week before the Security 
Council passed a resolution that authorized a no-fly zone over 
Libya.269 An inference can be drawn that as a result of this de-
lay,270 NATO took over the situation.271 This raises concerns as 
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to whether the AU Assembly has, in fact, changed its stance of 
non-intervention in internal armed conflicts. 
Lack of financial resources and unwillingness by member 
states to contribute finances and troops hamper the work of the 
AU. Without proper funding, the AU will fail in its missions. 
Indeed, the “lack of funding for AU operations” and many 
member states defaulting on their annual contributions are 
huge obstacles to the AU’s efficient operation.272 It is crucial 
that the member states make their annual contributions to the 
AU’s budget, and the AU Assembly takes it seriously when the 
member states default on their contributions. In this regard, 
the Constitutive Act gives the AU Assembly the power to issue 
sanctions against the defaulting states.273 The sanctions in-
clude the “denial of the right to speak at meetings, to vote, to 
present candidates for any position or post within the [AU] or 
to benefit from any activity or commitments” within the AU.274 
Furthermore, the missions were authorized and mandated by 
the Security Council.275 Therefore, it seems that, at least for 
the time being, the AU will have to rely on the U.N. assistance 
to carry out its mandates effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
The following observations can be made regarding the AU’s 
right to intervention: First, this discussion is evidence that Af-
rica is making progress in dealing with international crimes 
that are committed during armed conflict by reserving for itself 
the right to intervene in a member states where such crimes 
are being committed. This is further evidenced by the creation 
of organs that aim to enable the AU to deal with international 
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crimes within the region. However, this does not mean that the 
African community can solve these problems in isolation from 
the international community as a whole, as there is nothing in 
the U.N. Charter that states a regional organization has priori-
ty over the Security Council and that the Security Council 
must step aside when the regional organization decides to act 
locally to stop atrocities. 
Second, the fact that the AU has not exercised its right to in-
tervene pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act—which 
does not require the consent of states—shows that the AU has 
not completely rid itself of the impediments brought about by 
the principles of sovereignty which have largely crippled the 
OAU in the past. Thabo Mbeki, the former AU Chairperson 
and former President of South Africa, has said: 
[W]e have to agree that we cannot be ruled by a doctrine of 
absolute sovereignty. We should not allow the fact of the in-
dependence of each one our countries to turn us into specta-
tors when crimes against the people are being committed . . . . 
As independent states we have developed in the context of a 
largely unbridled respect for the notion of the national sover-
eignty. We must therefore foresee somewhat of a struggle to 
ensure that the approach adopted by the [AU] . . . wins the 
day.276 
Thirdly, the financial situation within the AU also hinders 
the AU from exercising its duties, including exercising the 
right to intervene. Fourth and most importantly, the AU still 
needs to clarify what the right to intervene means. In order to 
do so, there is an urgent need for the AU to ensure that the Af-
rican Court of Justice or the African Court of Justice and Hu-
man Rights becomes operational in order to interpret the pro-
visions of the Constitutive Act on intervention. Once these 
courts are fully established, one should hope that nothing will 
hinder the AU from exercising its right to intervene because 
Africa needs the AU leaders’ guarantees that they will prompt-
ly deal with any international crimes committed in the territo-
ry of member states during armed conflict. 
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However, concerns about the AU’s ability to intervene come 
to the surface when recognizing the fact that the only time the 
AU is willing to act is (1) when there is an unconstitutional 
change in government and (2) when the international commu-
nity threatens to take over the situation. Therefore, while the 
AU has reserved for itself a legal duty to intervene, its attitude 
toward such a duty raises concerns because of its apparent ad-
herence to the principles of non-interference and territorial in-
tegrity. Simultaneously, one may also argue that unless the AU 
has a clear view of the meaning of the right to intervene in 
terms of Article 4(h), it will be hard to exercise this right. 
Despite the challenges outlined above, the AU has demon-
strated that it is willing to intervene in cases where internal 
armed conflicts threaten peace and security in Africa, as evi-
denced by its missions in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia. Alt-
hough the missions have either been passed to the U.N. or are 
still ongoing, the initial decision by the AU to undertake them 
demonstrate the willingness to take the primary responsibility 
for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide commit-
ted in the African region. There is hope that in time, and 
through trials and tribulations, the AU may have a strong 
chance of dealing with those international crimes that may ad-
versely impact the peace and security of Africa. 
 
